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Abstract
This article examines Russian human service non-profit organisations (NPOs) to investigate the 
nature of civil society in a managed democracy. Specifically the focus is on emerging vertical ties 
between NPOs and ruling and governing elites. Drawing on qualitative data collected from health 
and education NPOs in three industrial regions, we find that in establishing such vertical ties the 
role of organisations and individuals within is changing – they have moved away from ignored 
outsiders towards accessing the circles of power and being tasked with managing the boundary 
between the state and civil society. In exploring these arrangements this article highlights that in 
the post-Soviet space, NPOs and the state are closely intertwined resembling co-optation. As a 
result the democratisation potential of human service NPOs is constrained. In discussing these 
insights we also draw parallels to contexts in which the state has outsourced welfare service to 
human service NPOs.
Keywords
managed democracy, NPOs, Russia, transactional activism
Introduction
Traditional approaches to civil society assume a political context that is supportive of 
both civil society activity and public participation (Hsu, 2010). The Tocquevillian par-
ticipatory conceptualisation of civil society thus dominates the understanding of this 
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concept (Hayes and Horne, 2011; Muukkonen, 2009; Petrova and Tarrow, 2007). 
Emphasising the ‘space located between the family and the state’ (Henry and Sundstrom, 
2006: 5) it excludes the market (Ehrenberg, 1999) and political parties (Henry and 
Sundstrom, 2006). Hence, civil society is a societal space or public sphere and is made 
up of self-organising agents (Henry and Sundstrom, 2006). Civil society is also consid-
ered the home for social movements, that is the grouping of various agents for the spe-
cific purpose of pursuing political or social objectives (Diani, 1992; Tarrow, 1988). It is 
these voluntary associations that form the basis for the concern of this study – non-profit 
organisations (NPOs). Thus NPOs are institutionalised actors within civil society and 
some can be described as organisations that engage in providing services to a designated 
constituency (Muukkonen, 2009). They are frequently referred to as human service 
NPOs (Almog-Bar and Schmid, 2014). However, the participatory nature of NPOs is an 
uneasy fit when examining behaviours and characteristics in contexts where NPO activ-
ity and/or public participation therein is constrained. In such a context NPOs lack public 
support and refrain from engaging the public often focusing instead on maintaining, 
rather than challenging or attempting to challenge the state or its agents (Hsu, 2010; 
Lewis, 2013). In this article we explore the concept of civil society in such a context.
The experience of NPOs in post-Communist countries tests the assumption that NPOs 
actively seek public participation and encourage associational life (i.e. commonly 
referred to as the democratising outcome of NPOs (Putnam, 1995)) as a means to hold 
the state to account or influence public policy. Petrova and Tarrow (2007), studying 
NPOs in Hungary, highlight how rather than mobilising the public to support their cause, 
NPOs in this post-Communist context engaged with their peers (i.e. horizontal ties) and 
with ruling and governing elites (i.e. vertical ties) enabling them to hold the state to 
account and influence public policy, without soliciting public participation. Thus, Petrova 
and Tarrow (2007) argue that in a post-Communist context NPOs focus on engaging in 
‘ties – enduring and temporary – among organised non-state actors and between them 
and political parties, power holders, and other institutions’ (Petrova and Tarrow, 2007: 
79); a transactional model of civil society. We examine this understanding by focusing 
on Russian human service NPOs’ vertical ties.
Following the end of Communism, the societies of the successor states of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union took different developmental trajec-
tories. Pickvance (1998) observed that relatively weaker states and stronger media inter-
ests created favourable conditions for civil society development in CEE countries such 
as Hungary. In contrast, within the Russian Federation conditions were less favourable 
for civil society development (Pickvance, 1998). Fragmentation of the social movements 
that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union and limited resources emanating 
almost exclusively from overseas meant that civil society development remained in a 
holding pattern of under-development (Sundstrom and Henry, 2006). As a consequence, 
Russian NPOs focused on developing relationships with foreign donors rather than col-
laboration with other organisations, the Russian state (Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010) or 
engagement with their constituencies (Salmenniemi, 2008). Furthermore, NPOs faced 
hostility from the state (Pickvance, 1998) and although there was no direct suppression 
of NPO activities, the state simply ignored NPOs and any demands made by them 
(Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010).
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After a period of economic turmoil and the ascendance to power of President Putin, a 
system termed managed democracy, in which the state controls all significant areas of 
societal activity has emerged (Wegren and Konitzer, 2007) – this ultimately curtailing 
the activity of Russian NPOs. Charitable donations in the Russian Federation also remain 
persistently low (CAF Russia, 2014) and so the state has emerged as a vital, and in many 
cases only, funding source to NPOs encouraging such organisations to contribute to 
social service provision. At the same time the passing of successive pieces of legislation 
has effectively outlawed donations from overseas as well as restricting advocacy and 
protest activities (Crotty et al., 2014; Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014, 2015). Daucé 
(2015) terms this development duality of coercion, where the state use regulatory powers 
to suppress NPO activity, in particular (horizontal) domestic or international cooperation 
for advocacy or protest purposes and holding the state to account, as well as simultane-
ously encouraging NPOs to contribute to what it considers the amelioration of social ills. 
As a result NPOs rely on ties with ruling and governing elites to navigate this complex 
environment and survive.
Mosley (2012), in examining the impact of state funding of NPOs in the United States, 
finds that as a result of state funding, human service NPOs have developed working 
relationships with the state to ensure cash flow. These relationships have also provided 
NPOs with access to power holders, enabling them to engage not only in service provi-
sion but also in advocacy. As advocates both for their constituents and their key issue(s) 
NPOs can leverage these closer ties and resultant access and thus contribute to public 
discourse, decision making and hold relevant state authorities to account (Mosley, 2012). 
Moreover, such relationships often result in key individuals becoming boundary-cross-
ers, moving ‘backwards and forwards across [sector] boundaries’ (Lewis, 2008: 572). 
Boundary-crossers are engaged in one sector (state or NPO) at a time, yet their frequent 
movements between sectors enables them to ‘oil the relationship between government 
and third sector [NPOs]’ (Lewis, 2008: 572). The resultant ties both with the state and the 
NPO sector provide key individuals within human service NPOs with the opportunity to 
advocate on specific issues pertinent to their organisational goals, though the literature 
indicates that this is often on an informal basis (Mosley, 2012; see also Chaves et al., 
2004; Jung et al., 2014; Neumayr et al., 2015). Hence, in an established democratic sys-
tem, ties emerging from closer cooperation between the state and human service NPOs 
due to resource dependencies, provide such NPOs with a basis to contribute to wider 
governance, albeit limited to their area of expertise and engagement (Mosley, 2012).
In a democratising context, the literature attributes primacy to organisations that pro-
mote (human) rights and are mainly focused on protest or advocacy (Muukkonen, 2009; 
Petrova and Tarrow, 2007; Tarrow, 1988) and, therefore, often neglects the role human 
service NPOs could potentially play (Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). Rights-
focused NPOs tend to be confrontational and are consequently, as in the Russian case, 
more likely to be closely regulated by the state to negate dissent (Daucé, 2015; Lewis, 
2013; Ljubownikow et al., 2013; Robertson, 2009). Conversely, human service NPOs, 
while almost exclusively reliant on the state for resources are thus less confrontational and 
likely to have the opportunity to develop ties with power holders. It is the emergence and 
use of such vertical ties and the operationalisation of such ties by Russian NPOs that this 
article examines. We ask, how do Russian human service NPOs engage in or establish 
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vertical ties in a managed democracy? Also, what sort of organisational behaviours and 
responses do these emerging vertical ties encourage? To answer these questions we opera-
tionalise data collected from health and education NPOs (HENPOs) in three industrial 
regions in the Russian Federation. This enables us to deepen our understanding of contex-
tual influences on NPOs and provide a more nuanced insight into the emerging civil soci-
ety arrangements within Russia’s managed democracy. Before doing so we first give an 
overview of the development of civil society in the Russian Federation so as to set the 
research in context. After presenting our research study and empirical findings, we close 
our article with a discussion and conclusions.
Civil Society Development in the Russian Federation
Contemporary civil society development in the Russian Federation traces its roots to the 
dissident activities of the environmental movement during the Soviet period1 (Weiner, 
2002). The intelligentsia, staff and students at the Soviet Union’s elite universities, pur-
sued these activities, with no aspirations to become a mass movement, and hence these 
groups viewed themselves as separate from the public (Mendelson and Gerber, 2007; 
Weiner, 2002). However, during perestroika, the wider public viewed environmental 
issues a safe way to campaign against the excesses of central planning (Weiner, 2002). 
As a result it subsequently became a mass movement and played a key role in the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union (Weiner, 2002).
With restrictions on personal expressions lifted and mirroring other contexts undergo-
ing market-based economic reforms and democratisation (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013), 
NPO numbers grew rapidly in post-Soviet Russia. However, public support for NPOs 
dwindled and mistrust between the public and governing elites that had dominated Soviet 
culture was extended to NPOs (Howard, 2002). In addition, the continuing dominance of 
Soviet cultural values in political institutions (Hedlund, 2006), as well as in social organ-
isations such as NPOs (Spencer, 2011), meant that the majority of Russian NPOs 
remained parochial and inward-looking (Crotty, 2006; Mendelson and Gerber, 2007; 
Spencer, 2011) and uninterested in engaging the wider public. Despite this, and although 
human service NPOs tend to be more professionalised and managerial (i.e. hierarchical) 
in nature (Hwang and Powell, 2009), in western democracies their engagement with both 
the wider public and their constituencies enabled them to behave as agents for their 
cause, promoting transparency and accountability of the state (Mosley, 2012), if not nec-
essarily of themselves.
However, post-1991 the Russian state ignored NPOs (Pickvance, 1998), which meant 
that very little domestic state support was available to them. Russian NPOs were thus 
forced to rely on donations from overseas (Henderson, 2002), as with no tradition of 
charitable giving, the public failed to offer support to Russia’s emerging civil society. 
This overseas funding was administered through competitive tendering and resulted in 
domestic groups adopting the agenda of the donor rather than that of the Russian public 
(Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010; Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). Consequently, 
rather than focusing on the development of horizontal ties with their peers and engaging 
the public, Russian NPOs focused on developing (vertical) ties with overseas donors as 
they were their only consistent funding source (Salmenniemi, 2008).
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More recently, the state has attempted to re-nationalise2 civil society and its agents 
(Ljubownikow et al., 2013; Robertson, 2009) via the adoption of a restrictive regulatory 
environment (Crotty et al., 2014; Ljubownikow and Crotty, 2014). These regulatory 
changes allow the Russian state to scrutinise NPO activity and membership and have 
placed restrictions on the receipt of overseas funds (Machleder, 2006) with NPOs that are 
engaged in, loosely defined, political activity and receiving overseas funding now con-
sidered foreign agents (Bennetts, 2012). Other regulatory developments affecting NPOs 
include heavy fines for unofficial demonstrations (Bryanski, 2012) and the criminalisa-
tion of libel and increased internet censorship (Lewis, 2013).
Reflecting the duality of coercion approach (Daucé, 2015), the state has stimulated 
state–NPO interaction by establishing the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation 
(Richter, 2009). The Civic Chamber and its regional and local offshoots are portrayed as 
providing an institutionalised setting for NPOs to raise concerns and represent the inter-
est of their constituencies or clients or hold the state to account (Richter, 2009). The 
Civic Chamber has also been given the responsibility of administering state funding for 
NPOs (Richter, 2009). The de-facto outlawing of overseas funding and persistently low 
donations per head (only 6% of the Russian population made a donation to charity in 
2013 (CAF Russia, 2014)) have made resources provided by this channel an important if 
not the only income source for Russian NPOs. Therefore, we argue that this specific 
Russian context makes vertical ties increasingly important to NPOs for both obtaining 
legitimacy and their day-to-day activities (i.e. service provision). However, this does 
provide them with the opportunity potentially to influence power holders in order to 
advance the causes and social movement they represent. To examine this proposition we 
utilise qualitative data collected in industrialised provincial Russia. Before we present 
our insights, we outline our research study.
Research Study
The cities of Moscow and St Petersburg are said to be unrepresentative of most of Russia 
(Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). Therefore, to capture a better representation 
of NPOs and their activism in Russia, we base our study in the regional cities of Perm, 
Yekaterinburg and Samara. All three reflect the industrialised nature of most Russian 
provincial towns (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010) and are also the capital cities of 
their respective regions (Oblast’) or territories (Krai), which means a concentration of 
state authorities and thus power holders. By examining organisations in these three cities 
it enables us to compare whether political opportunities3 differ. Therefore, focusing on 
vertical ties provides us with an analytical lens to establish political opportunities and 
whether NPOs create protest fields, that is engagement ‘in action opposing formal power 
arrangements’ (Ray, 1999: 8).
In order to capture vertical ties and to record accurately and probe respondents’ own 
interpretation of events and behaviours, a quantitative approach was deemed less appro-
priate (Salmenniemi, 2005). Therefore, we operationalised a qualitative approach to cap-
ture the respondent’s own interpretations assisting us in evaluating how respondents 
understand the institutional environment of their organisations, which are shaping organ-
isational characteristics and behaviours. Data collection was done via semi-structured 
 at Royal Hallamshire on October 23, 2015soc.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
6 Sociology 
interviews with key organisational decision makers, via observation of organisational 
activities and via organisational documentation.
The literature on civil society development in Russia (Sundstrom and Henry, 2006) 
and idea of transactional activism (Petrova and Tarrow, 2007) informed a semi-struc-
tured interview protocol which was translated into Russian for data collection. The inter-
view protocol contained questions such as what projects/activities organisations engage 
in, whether and how they cooperate with other similar organisations, whether, how and 
for what purpose they engage with ruling and governing elites. The interview questions 
were kept as open as possible to ensure that respondents were able to provide an exten-
sive narrative of their organisations modus operandi (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).
The interviews were conducted with leaders/directors of HENPOs. These are mainly 
middle-aged women (reflecting the feminine nature of human service NPOs observed by 
Salmenniemi (2005)) with most having at least one higher education degree. As with 
other Russian NPOs, HENPOs in this study were dominated by ‘democratic centralism’ 
(Spencer, 2011: 1080), where the leader’s ideas are automatically adopted by full mem-
ber consent. Hence our study focused on interviewing leaders/directors as their response 
represents the most relevant opinion to organisational decision making. On average, 
interviews lasted 45 minutes and were conducted in Russian without an interpreter. To 
reduce self-reporting bias, interview data were triangulated by observational data (cap-
tured in a daily research diary (Silverman, 2005)) and artefacts collected by attending 
HENPO events (such as flyers, pamphlets and published material).
HENPOs were initially identified using web-based resources as well as through the 
assistance provided by partner universities in Perm, Samara and Yekaterinburg. In order 
to select organisations purposefully (Siggelkow, 2007) for this study, NPOs were 
screened for their objectives and whether or not they understand themselves as social 
organisations (i.e. obshchestvennyye organisatsii – a commonly accepted term used by 
both HENPOs and the Russian state to classify NPOs). An initial list of 35 organisations 
was extended using local phone directories and the snowballing technique, with the latter 
also providing insights about interaction between NPOs. The study had 80 participating 
organisations across the three regions with 49 providing health-related services, 25 pro-
viding educational service, one organisation providing both and five organisations pro-
viding infrastructure service to HENPOs, such as, for example, access to office space.
For analytical purposes all interviews were transcribed and translated simultaneously 
into English, calling on the skills of native speakers wherever discrepancies arose. The 
interview material was coded inductively. As the interview transcripts were read and 
reread in the coding process, new codes emerged and existing codes were adjusted 
(Charmaz and Mitchell, 2007). Codes carried labels such as ‘activities of NPOs’, ‘inter-
action with other NPOs’, ‘collaboration with other NPOs’, ‘interaction with state author-
ities’, ‘collaboration with state authorities’ or ‘access to state authority X’. These codes 
were brought together to form emerging themes, which described the characteristics of 
vertical ties and behaviours of HENPOs (i.e. engagement in vertical ties, engagement in 
horizontal ties, operationalisation of ties).
To ensure reliability, the emerging codes were discussed with field experts (academ-
ics with extensive knowledge of the development of Russian civil society) who helped to 
reduce ambiguities. This enabled the grouping of the evidence according to the similarity 
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of the respondents’ discourses and geographical locations forming a basis to compare 
any differences from and similarities to how HENPOs engage in vertical ties. The discus-
sion that follows explores these aspects using narratives from these interviews.
Findings
In reviewing the data, we find that HENPOs’ behaviours are indicative of aspects of the 
transactional model of civil society observed by Petrova and Tarrow (2007). While our 
data indicate that Russian HENPOs lack engagement with horizontal ties, respondents 
focused their engagement on power holders and thus build vertical ties. Institutionalised 
contact points such as the Civic Chamber have led to the emergence of myriad roundta-
bles (kruglyye stoly) or committees (Richter, 2009) and have facilitated this process giv-
ing HENPOs access to state structures (Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010).
In reviewing the respondents’ narratives we find that there were some regional differ-
ences in HENPOs’ portrayal of how relationships with governing elites were established, 
their outcomes and the assessment of these developments. This is suggestive of differing 
political opportunities within these regions, particularly when comparing Perm Krai with 
Samara and Yekaterinburg Oblasti. In presenting HENPOs’ engagement in vertical ties 
we also highlight that these did not create protest fields in which such organisations 
could engage to hold the state to account (Ray, 1999). Instead narratives were dominated 
by the phenomenon of sucking in. Sucking in occurred when key individuals within 
HENPOs were incentivised to deploy their expertise within the state apparatus. However, 
sucked in individuals would also retain a role within their HENPOs thus spanning and 
blurring the boundary between civil society and the state. We present these findings in 
more detail below.
Vertical Ties of HENPOs in Yekaterinburg
In reviewing the data from HENPOs in Yekaterinburg we found that respondents engaged 
in various roundtables and committees organised by the state. Some highlighted that as a 
consequence they had been sucked in to ‘work for the state’ (Respondent 49, Org01Yek; 
Respondent 51, Org03Yek; Respondent 61, Org11Yek; Respondent 62, Org12Yek). This 
resulted in the acquisition of ‘a desk in the state administration’ (Respondent 51, Org03Yek), 
acting as regular consultants or as ‘an expert with the department of education’ (Respondent 
52, Org04Yek), providing ‘advice as an expert’ (Respondent 49, Org01Yek), or working in 
close physical proximity with state agencies – ‘our office is down the corridor from the 
department of social protection’ (Respondent 75, Org26Yek). Further, respondents outlined 
that their government role overlapped with their organisational role. Respondent 51 
(Org03Yek) indicated that part of her role was to oversee accessibility regulations for pub-
lic buildings throughout the city. At the same time, a key objective of Org03Yek was to 
promote and ensure accessibility to public buildings and spaces.
However, rather than considering this as compromising the organisation’s ability to 
monitor the state’s policy adherence, Respondent 51 considered this as a ‘good way to 
collaborate with the state’ (Respondent 51, Org03Yek). Others also reflected this, high-
lighting that such a set-up ensured that ‘when we work with the state, it is always a 
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win–win’ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek) and ‘[we] make friends in the administration’ 
(Respondent 79, Org30Yek).
Respondents also illustrated the operationalisation of emerging vertical ties to secure 
resources. For example, Respondent 52 (Org04Yek) stated that her government role 
meant that they could access premises from which to run her organisation, ‘many old 
nursery buildings were in decay, [and subsequently] we were given this building here [by 
the state], which we refurbished with money from sponsors and the state’. Org04Yek 
now uses this building as a base for their work with children with mental health needs. 
Similarly, Respondent 65 (Org16Yek) illustrated how her organisation was unable to pay 
staff a wage. As a result of her participation in state-run committees she was able to con-
vince state authorities to ‘hire me and the organisation’s other employees’ (Respondent 
65, Org16Yek). Now all staff were employed full time by the state while they ran their 
HENPO promoting physical activity among children with learning difficulties. Both 
Org04Yek and Org16Yek indicated that, without these ties, their HENPOs would not be 
‘helping all these children’ (Respondent 52, Org04Yek) or continue ‘enabling such chil-
dren to do physical activity’ (Respondent 65, Org16Yek).
Others who highlighted being sucked in stated that they could also use these ties to 
secure government ‘support’ (Respondent 60, Org11Yek) without which ‘it will be dif-
ficult for us to do our work’ (Respondent 81, Org32Yek) or ‘talk to the people that could 
help [them do their work]’ (Respondent 64, Org15Yek). Thus, by being sucked in, these 
individuals ensured that organisations continued their day-to-day activities and building 
these vertical ties helped to ensure their organisation’s future.
The sucking in narrative of respondents, and their lack of operationalising the emerg-
ing vertical ties for dissent, mirrors the process of co-optation in particular limiting and 
managing dissent by bringing challengers into the governance system (Coy, 2013). 
However, rather than seeing it as co-optation, respondents saw this process as a way of 
aligning their organisation’s objectives with that of the state. Thus respondents under-
stood themselves in a dual role – spanning and indeed managing the boundary between 
civil society (i.e. what their organisation does) and the state (i.e. what the responsibilities 
of the state are) rather than achieving full insider status (i.e. shaping state policy). 
However, while it allowed organisations to engage with the state and thus created poten-
tial opportunities for influence, it simultaneously reduced their potential fields of protest 
(i.e. opposing formal power arrangements (Ray, 1999)). It was therefore difficult for a 
Russian NPO of any type to protest state policy that it has been a part of delivering. 
Respondents in Samara Oblast’ expressed similar narratives.
Vertical Ties of HENPOs in Samara
HENPOs in Samara replicated the accounts of respondents in Yekaterinburg in so far as 
they demonstrate the sucking in narrative. Respondent 19, for example, was responsible 
for the implementation of the city’s youth programme and policies as part of her role in 
the state: ‘I do not work here all the time [in this HENPO]. I work for the state and I focus 
on the development of youth policy’ (Respondent 19, Org20Sam). Org20Sam worked on 
the same issues with their objective being ‘improving the life of children’ (Mission 
Statement, Org20Sam). Similar to Yekaterinburg, the nature of the roles of sucked in 
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individuals made it difficult for them and their organisation to protest formally state 
policy – they had become an extension of it. In the case of Org20Sam, to criticise state 
youth policy would in effect be criticising the work of their organisational leader, thus 
restricting the fields of protest such organisations could participate in. Other than in 
Yekaterinburg, HENPOs highlighted the attendant benefits of being in charge of manag-
ing the boundary between NPOs and the state. These were in the form of cooperation or 
collaborative activities and included closer ‘contact to the department’ (Respondent 15, 
Org16Sam), increased ability to ‘cooperate with the state’ (Respondent 3, Org03Sam) 
and to ‘work with state institutions’ (Respondent 22, Org21Sam). Respondents also con-
sidered having key decision makers sucked in from HENPOs as a way of building cross-
sector partnerships or collaborations: ‘Without between sector interactions you would 
not survive a day, so we build good relations with the regional powers. These relations 
are constructive because we offer services and programmes, which they [the state] accept 
and support’ (Respondent 1, Org01Sam).
An attendant benefit of these arrangements provided access to resources such as 
‘office space’ (Respondent 1, Org01Sam; Respondent 2, Org02Sam; Respondent 3, 
Org03Sam; Respondent 14, Org15Sam; Respondent 23, Org24Sam). In turn this enabled 
HENPOs to work ‘closely together with the government authorities’ (Respondent 05, 
Org05Sam). These closer ties provided individuals with opportunities to engage policy 
makers, highlighting how they not only sucked in or co-opted but were able to negotiate 
and manage the boundary between state and civil society. Therefore, HENPOs in Samara 
viewed this as a ‘positive development’ (Respondent 4, Org04Sam). They could utilise 
vertical ties with the state to support their work. They also perceived being sucked in as 
a way to engage with the state, that the state now ‘listens to our problems’ (Respondent 
15, Org16Sam) and showed ‘appreciation’ (Respondent 19, Org20Sam; Respondent 9, 
Org09Sam).
The Samara narratives highlight that by being sucked in, NPOs might be co-opted to 
serve as agents for the state, but they are also able to better navigate Russia’s institutional 
environment and are even in a position to make their issue heard by relevant authorities. 
Hence, sucked in individuals are responsible for managing the boundary between the 
state and civil society agents. In so doing, the sucking in narrative reflects a process of 
political socialisation (Fillieule, 2013) turning respondents from ignored outsiders into 
appreciated insiders (Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010). However, as in Yekaterinburg, this 
development limited organisations’ potential to protest. In contrast, respondents in Perm 
Krai had a more critical assessment of these developments.
Vertical Ties of HENPOs in Perm
HENPOs in Perm also reflected the sucking in narrative constructed by those in 
Yekaterinburg and Samara. However, unlike their counterparts, HENPOs in Perm 
expressed unease at the potential outcomes: ‘I think the danger is that an elite of HENPOs 
is emerging. As a result, the state will only interact with them and other organisations 
will have no chance to work with the state’ (Respondent 37, Org12Per). Resonating with 
this statement, other HENPOs feared that sucking in was a double-edged sword, positive 
for those that were able to establish vertical ties and access resources and negative for 
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those that missed out. Informal probing of what organisations would benefit positively 
from such civil society arrangements led to the consensual suggestion that individuals 
from HENPOs, in particular those working with children or the disabled, were more 
likely to be sucked in than those from organisations dealing HIV/AIDS or drug abuse 
(Respondents 25, 30, 37, 43, 45, 48). As a result, HENPOs from which individuals were 
sucked in might become supporters or legitimisers of state policy (Cook and Vinogradova, 
2006). Thus, as observed in similar contexts, this contributes to the legitimacy of current 
power arrangements rather than challenging them (Hsu, 2010; Lewis, 2013).
In Perm, HENPOs also illustrated that the interest of the state was not with the organi-
sation, as the narrative of respondents in Samara and Yekaterinburg suggested, but tar-
geted at specific individuals (who possess some specific human capital or expertise): 
‘They [the authorities] look for the key decision makers in civil society and then work 
with us to develop the third sector so it can do what it needs to’ (Respondent 45, 
Org20Per). This was a sentiment shared by respondents that had not been sucked in. 
They perceived that ‘the administration only works with the organisations they like’ 
(Respondent 31, Org07Per), specifically those organisations that did not explicitly chal-
lenge the state. Moreover, organisations that had access to the state were viewed as part 
of the state structure and so had lost their ‘connection with the public’ (Respondent 42, 
Org17Per).
The narrative of respondents in Perm suggesting that sucking in focused on individu-
als rather than organisations demonstrates a selective co-optation of individuals. Like in 
Yekaterinburg and Samara, the co-optation increased opportunities for the sucked in 
individuals to informally, via vertical ties, advocate for their cause, but it also reduced 
their, and their associated organisation’s opportunities to protest formally. Thus the suck-
ing in narrative leads to a more silent (i.e. informal) way of protesting, a development 
that has also been observed during so-called NGOisation processes elsewhere; that is, the 
professionalisation and institutionalisation of social action (Alvarez et al., 1998; Choudry 
and Kapoor, 2013; Lang, 1997).
Despite the more apprehensive assessment of the sucking in development, HENPOs 
in Perm were also required to liaise, collaborate and integrate more closely with power 
holders. Hence across all three regions the experience of HENPOs and key individuals 
reflects civil society arrangements dependent on vertical ties rather than mobilising the 
public. We now turn to discussing the insight from all three regions and its meaning for 
civil society development in the Russian Federation.
Discussion and Conclusion
In this article we set out to examine NPOs in a managed democracy. In illustrating 
Russia’s managed democracy we demonstrate how this encourages civil society arrange-
ments where NPOs are required to develop vertical ties with power holders. In order to 
be able to exist and participate in civil society we show that HENPOs now see them-
selves as sharing their ‘professional approaches’ (Respondent 49, Org01Yek), skills and 
expertise to help the state in addressing societal problems. In turn this facilitates the 
emergence of vertical ties, which respondents illustrate as facilitating access to resources 
and bestowing legitimacy. However, in order to encourage the sharing of expertise, the 
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state sucks in key organisational decision makers. Consequently, these individuals 
become what we term boundary managers responsible for managing the boundary 
between civil society (i.e. what their organisation does) and state (i.e. the activities of the 
state in their organisation’s area of activity). The concept of boundary managers extends 
our understanding of Lewis’s (2008) boundary-crossers concept into a managed demo-
cratic setting. Thus we define boundary managers as individuals responsible for shaping, 
articulating and overseeing the boundary between civil society and the state in this man-
aged context.
These sucking in processes are reflective of co-opting and to some extent profession-
alisation processes observed in other contexts, which have seen an increased reliance on 
government funding.4 In the Russian context it reflects the changing of principals, which 
are co-opting Russian civil society. With the state’s duality of coercion approach, encour-
aging participation to alleviate social ills (Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010), and provision 
of relevant resources, NPOs are now co-opted by the state. This mirrors Chourdy and 
Kapoor’s (2013) argument that NPOs and civil society remain a contested area. As 
respondents in Perm indicate, it empowers some individuals active within civil society 
and sidelines others. Under the Russian state’s current agenda it also redefines NPOs as 
being mainly service delivery agents, and doing this in collaboration with rather than 
against the state. At the organisational level, this effectively encourages the reinforce-
ment of democratic centralism in organisations where boundary managers reside. Sucked 
in individuals will see their internal organisational power base increase even further as 
they are now even more important with regards to accessing resources. Thus the emer-
gence of boundary managers in managed democracies highlights that it is more impor-
tant to be represented in relevant state structures rather than mobilising the public. This 
mirrors processes of professionalisation and NGOisation elsewhere where NPO activity 
becomes less about politics and more about efficiently addressing social problems 
(Alvarez et al., 1998; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013; Lang, 1997). Therefore, the experi-
ence of Russian NPOs contributes to the emerging question in civil society literature 
about whether NPOs can be drivers of democratisation. The Russian context shows that 
they are all too easily co-opted, moulded and restricted – be it by a political regime as 
demonstrated in this article, forces of neoliberal ideology as observed in the global south 
(Alvarez et al., 1998; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013) or resource dependencies and staff 
professionalisation driving hybridisation processes with NPOs losing their associational 
nature (Billis, 2010) in developed democracy contexts.
The insights provided in this article provide an indication of the role of human service 
NPOs in managed democracies which is more reflective of a transactional than a partici-
patory model and which we summarise in Figure 1.
Although dependency on government resources and professional staff has turned 
NPOs into more hybrid organisations (Billis, 2010), in an unmanaged democracy, human 
service NPOs still have diversified income streams with often the public providing a 
consistent and important part of their required resources (Mosley, 2012). In Russia’s 
managed democracy, where public support for NPOs remains constrained, the state is the 
only source of consistent funding. Whereas, despite resource dependencies, human ser-
vice NPOs are able to challenge the state’s policy agenda in an unmanaged democracy 
(see Chaves et al., 2004; Mosley, 2012; Neumayr et al., 2015 for an illustration that state 
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funding does not necessarily restrict NPOs’ political or advocacy activity), in a managed 
democracy human service NPOs become purveyors of that policy agenda (see also 
Lewis, 2013 on the role of NPOs in restrictive/authoritarian political regimes) but also 
address social ills by providing services. In providing services, NPOs still bridge between 
the individual and the state and in some cases substitute the state to address the socio-
economic needs of marginalised groups (Lewis, 2013). Thus, human service NPOs are 
allowed to exist because they carry out an important social function the state is unwilling 
or unable to carry out (Hsu, 2010; Uphoff and Krishna, 2004). It seems that even Russia’s 
managed democratic state considers NPOs as a panacea for its social problems (Choudry 
and Kapoor, 2013), which should provide such organisations and boundary managers 
with political opportunities. However, as the arrangements illustrated here are still 
emerging, capitalising on these political opportunities to advance the interest of their 
constituencies will take time. In the longer term this could enable Russian HENPOs not 
only to build fruitful vertical ties with governing elites, but also, as many respondents 
hope, facilitate ‘change from within’ (Respondent 32, Org08Per). Thus in the longer-
term, boundary managers may be able to carve out broader campaigning opportunities 
for their organisations (Newman, 2012) as a result.
Nevertheless, there were also similarities between human service NPOs in managed 
and other contexts, particularly western democracies with the organisation in the latter 
contexts increasingly providing welfare service outsourced by the state. Choudry and 
Shragge (2011) note that the subsequent professionalisation of, and focus on vertical ties 
(see Mosley, 2012) by such organisations can temper their appetite for dissent turning 
them into parts of the state’s governing arrangements. Hence sucking in mirrors a form 
of ‘regulation and containment of interest representation’ (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013: 1) 
contributing to the institutionalisation, depolitisation and demobilisation of social 
Figure 1. Civil society arrangements in a managed democracy.
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movements (Choudry and Kapoor, 2013). This then leaves rights-focused NPOs as the 
sole agents that will hold the state to account often through protest and other more direct 
methods.
The data presented in this article indicate that the re-assertion of control by the state 
over Russian civil society has solicited organisational responses that have reshaped this 
particular organisational field. A civil society that during the earlier part of transition was 
separated, neglected and ignored by the state is now, where it poses no threat to the state, 
closely intertwined. This outcome reflects the duality of coercion approach by the 
Russian state (Daucé, 2015) and institutionalised civil society in more restrictive and 
authoritarian contexts (Lewis, 2013). The current resource dependency arrangements 
(i.e. power distribution) and the undemocratic nature of NPOs themselves (i.e. reflective 
of current political culture) ensure the maintenance of a political field (Ray, 1999) where 
opportunities for protest are limited.
Our conclusions have to be seen in light of the limitations of this study. Our study 
provides an insight into the behaviours of human service NPOs in two types of industrial 
regions (i.e. Krai and Oblast’) and is thus not directly representative of those in more 
rural and less industrial regions, the urban centres of Moscow and St Petersburg or 
regions, which enjoy more political autonomy. Furthermore, a larger sample, different 
methodological approach and different sectors may have pointed to different illustrations 
of organisational and key individuals’ behaviour and their narratives. In particular future 
research will need to focus on NPOs, which are less resource dependent on the state. 
Nevertheless, our results do show a strong relationship with the extended literature of 
civil society in Russia (Crotty, 2006; Henry, 2006; Jakobson and Sanovich, 2010; 
Spencer, 2011; Sundstrom and Henry, 2006) and thus a potential basis for understanding 
civil society in the Russian context.
Thus, notwithstanding its limitations, our article makes two key contributions to the 
discussion of the concept of civil society. First our article contributes to the question of 
what civil society is in the post-Socialist/post-Communist context. We show that in 
Russia, active, reasonably well-funded human service NPOs are now intertwined with 
the state. This reflects the traditionally more (inter)dependent institutional arrange-
ments found in other transition states including many of the Central Asian Republics 
and China (Richter and Hatch, 2013). In such a context we conclude that we require a 
different model to understand prevailing civil society arrangements (see Figure 1). 
Second, our article contributes to the discussion of civil society in restrictive contexts. 
As illustrated at the onset of the article, human service NPOs have the potential to con-
tribute to the democratisation process by holding the state to account within their area 
of expertise (Muukkonen, 2009). However, Lewis (2013) suggests that in such restric-
tive contexts civil society agents do little to contribute to further democratisation as 
they lack public engagement, horizontal cooperation and reflect dominant political cul-
ture. Our findings dovetail with this assertion. However, our study highlights the need 
to understand NPOs’ use of vertical ties and whether it enables NPOs to work the spaces 
of power (Newman, 2012). In the Russian case, although sucking in individuals is 
reflective of co-optation by the state, as boundary managers these individuals are put in 
positions that may in the longer term provide them with the potential to work the spaces 
of power.
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Notes
1. By contemporary civil society development we refer to civil society development following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union (Ljubownikow et al., 2013). Some authors argue that civil 
society development in post-Soviet Russia draws on social and institutional roots originat-
ing in the pre-Communist period where charitable activity was encouraged (Jakobson and 
Sanovich, 2010; Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010). In this article we follow the 
argument made elsewhere that both the Tsarist and Communist regime were largely authori-
tarian and restrictive to civil society activity and have created a path dependent development 
trajectory which has influenced civil society development ever since (Ljubownikow et al., 
2013).
2. During the Soviet Union the state maintained a widespread network of social organisations, 
linked to the Communist Party, acting in a similar way to human service NPOs (Jakobson and 
Sanovich, 2010). Post-1991 many of those organisations became actual human service NPOs, 
which like newly forming NPOs were also neglected by the state (Jakobson and Sanovich, 
2010; Javeline and Lindemann-Komarova, 2010).
3. Political opportunities for NPOs (or social movements) result when political alignments shift 
and/or division within elite groupings occur and as a result they gain influential allies that can 
protect them from elite response (Tarrow, 1988).
4. We thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this assertion and insight.
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